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The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China has been a focus of study for 
many developing countries. It was initiated with a notion of experiment that foreign capital is 
an important instrument to put the country on a growth path of economic development and 
modernization while simultaneously integrating the inner regions with the main economic 
activity and development of the country. The Chinese experience of SEZs turned out to be a 
success in some sense as it could fulfill the  goal of the people and the Government. It is 
sometimes argued that SEZs have become a multiplier of economic activity which has 
supported the economy. It has become an instrument in empowering human resources and 
promoting inclusive growth.   
The paper makes an attempt to understand the concept behind this initiative; what political 
reforms were taken to set up SEZ; how it contributed to the growth of the Chinese economy; 
how FDI attracted by SEZ played a critical role in promoting exports, providing employment 
and overall creating an inclusive growth. The paper further tries to analyze if the SEZ model 
can be a vehicle for inclusive growth and what are the key challenges remaining for the firms 
and the government to address in making it sustainable model of growth. How key 
environmental and natural resources such as water, oil, electricity, land etc. are important for 
SEZs survival and log term growth. The paper provides policy recommendations for future 
establishment of SEZs in China and the lessons that other developing economies can learn from 
this Chinese venture. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The importance of foreign capital was gradually recognized by many developing countries 
when they were exposed to the competition brought by globalization. Many of them in the 
eighties and nineties visualized foreign capital as an effective instrument to secure their fast 
economic growth and successful transformation. They felt that the foreign capital has the 
necessary wherewithal in terms of providing monetary value, the required technology, the 
management practices and techniques and a sense of heightened competition essential for 
achieving higher economic growth. It is this essentiality which prompted many developing and 
transitional economies to consider that much needed foreign capital is important for speedy 
modernization as well as their access to industrialized markets. 
Number of countries in Asia thus in the eighties were opened to the outside world fully 
realizing the fact that their initial adoption of import substitution strategy for industrialization 
proved inadequate in the wake of fierce market competition propelled by globalization and 
technological advancement. This opening up had largely resulted in the rise of acquiring 
foreign capital by these countries. Various studies observed that foreign capital inflows to 
Asiatic region witnessed a continuous rise. The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to 
Asia rose from a meager US$ 5280mn in 1983-85 to 15588mn in 1990 and finally reached 
80299mn by 1998 (UNCTAD, 2000).Rapid growth of Asian tigers or Newly Industrialized 
Economies (NIEs) such as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong was made feasible 
because of their quick adoption of attracting this foreign capital and adopting in totality the 
policies that helped them to put this capital into the most effective use of their economic growth. 
Examples of successful NIEs indicated that there is a positive correlation between the openness 
and economic growth of a country. During this period, NIEs registered 2304mn in mid 1980s to 
reach 16667mn by 1998. 
China’s story wasn’t very different. Embarking on an open door policy in 1978, it followed a 
cautious and gradualist approach to recover from the economic setback it had during the 
Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, which continued till 1976. It had soon become aware of the 
significance of the foreign capital. Its initial modernization drive was accomplished due to the 
significant contribution of FDI. In a span of 15 odd years, China had become the second largest 
host country for FDI in the 1990s, second only to the USA and by far the largest receiving 
country among developing countries.  
However, developing countries including NIEs didn’t garner huge amount of inflows of foreign 
capital in a vacuum. All countries used different methods or instruments to attract foreign 
investors. One such important instrument was setting up of special geographical regions, 
popularly known as Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in the world. EPZs were practiced by 
many countries in the world to register high growth, promote exports and to create employment. 
Statistics from International Labor Organization (ILO) suggest that in the eighties and nineties 
the experiment with EPZs experienced an upward trend, totaling to more than 850 around the 
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world in 1998. In 2003, about 116 countries across the world had established EPZs and the 
number further went up to 3000 mark (World Economic Processing Zones Association). In 
China, they were better known as Special Economic Zones (SEZs). 
SEZ is a generic term that covers recent variants of the traditional commercial zones. The basic 
concept of a special economic zone includes several specific characteristics: (a) it is a 
geographically delimited area, usually physically secured; (b) it has a single management or 
administration; (c) it offers benefits based on physical location within the zone; and (d) it has a 
separate customs area (duty free benefits) and streamlined procedures (World Bank 2009). In 
addition, an SEZ normally operates under more liberal economic laws than those typically 
prevailing in the country. SEZ serves the economy in two major ways such as in ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’ ways. ‘Direct’ ways involves providing employment and securing foreign exchange 
and indirect ways includes skill up gradation, technology transfer, export diversification, 
efficiency gains for domestic firms. 
Potential Benefits derived from SEZs 
 Direct benefits Indirect Benefits 
Foreign exchange earnings yes  
FDI yes  
Employment generation yes  
Government revenue yes  
Export growth yes  
Skill upgrading - yes 
Technology transfer - yes 
Export diversification - yes 
Efficiency in domestic firms - yes 
Source: World Bank 2009 
The paper broadly looks at the period between1978-1997. It takes into account the above 
mentioned period as a matter of convenience and readymade data available to the author. It 
makes an attempt to understand the concept of SEZs. What were the political processes or 
attitudinal changes required to initiate the process. What were the specific reforms needed to 
establish SEZs and how FDI has contributed to the entire process? It will analyze in detail one 
major SEZ, which has helped promote exports and imports of the country and whether it had 
increased the prospects of employment. Lastly, it concludes with some policy recommendations.  
1. CONCEPT 
The idea of special zone didn’t originate with the Chinese. In fact creation of a special zone to 
promote economic development or trade gains is not even a new idea. In modern times, open 
areas were transformed into free trade zones in the 18th century such as Gibraltar in 1704, 
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Singapore in 1819 and Hong Kong in 1842.1 But, Chinese initiative of developing the SEZs in 
1979 is a conscious and carefully planned effort. Sources suggest that the Chinese Government 
studied a number of existing zones before they created their own.2 Besides, Chinese had their 
own share of experience with such concepts not drawn from the treaty port system which came 
into being during Opium War in 1842, but more recently from their own domestic affairs by 
creating special export commodity production bases steered under the leadership of Zhou Enlai 
during the Cultural Revolution. This program was established as a state policy in 1971 by the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade.3 
During early seventies China was still following the principles of “self reliance.” This policy 
meant to make her stand on her own feet without any foreign loans or assistance. As the 
Cultural Revolution continued for a decade, its economy faced severe setback and China was 
plunged into a major economic crisis. The then leaders led by Deng Xiaoping purged that the 
principle of self reliance was revised in its external economic policy. The then Chinese 
government put up a new slogan of “four modernizations” which was designed to help China to 
catch up with the western world in four different areas, namely agriculture, industry, science 
and technology and industry. The urge for modernization made her realize the vital necessity of 
attracting enormous amount of foreign capital and advanced technology. All this prompted her 
to seek and explore increased amount of economic and trade cooperation with capitalistic 
countries. It soon started with the process of imported materials and established linkages in 
various pattern of foreign trade and went even further for applying foreign governmental and 
non governmental loans. This external reliance motivated China in a significant way to frame a 
joint venture law ̶for the first time the Chinese government would permit the overseas 
enterprise to undertake joint venture with Chinese domestic industries and Chinese individual. 
The law was finally adopted in the fifth National People’s Congress on July 1 1979 as an epoch 
making event.4  
The establishment of this joint venture law complemented to the already launched economic 
reforms and open door policy began in 1978. The Chinese leaders understood that the 
readjustment of economy would be faster only with large number of inflows of foreign capital. 
As with the foreign capital came the advanced technology and management expertise, foreign 
investors were keen that a fundamental restructuring in the management practices of 
employment scenario in China should be done so that a sense of meritocracy is established. The 
                                                 
1 Economist Intelligence Unit (1979): Investment: The Growing Role of Export Processing Zones, Special Report 
No. 64. 
2 For example, the government officials were sent to Sri Lanka in 1979 and Bataan export processing zone in 
Philippines in 1981. James R. Stepanek, “China’s SEZs,” The China Business Review 9:2 (March-April 1982), p. 
38. 
3 Joseph E. Pattison, "Special Economic Zones in the People's Republic of China,” China Law Reporter 1:3 
(Spring 1981), p. 144. 
4 Sonoko Nishitateno, “ China’s Special Economic Zones: Experimental Units for Economic Reform,” The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 32 (1) (January, 1983), p.175. 
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economic policy of such special interest was formulated by the government to attract potential 
foreign investors. Secondly, to remove the irritation and delay at the bureaucratic level for 
speedy transfer of capital from the central Government to local authorities, the expansion of 
local autonomy was initiated. In this regard, the Central Government provided Guangdong and 
Fujian province with external economic autonomy including the competence to establish and 
regulate SEZs.5 Soon after the regulation on SEZs in Guangdong province was adopted in 
August 1980.6 
SEZs were thus set up in China with the purpose that they would largely complement the 
modernization process which was conceived in the concept of four modernization. SEZs in a 
country are established when a country delimits certain areas where through exemption of 
custom duties it formulates and grants various preferential conditions and provides different 
public facilities so as to attract foreign investors to set up factories whose finished products are 
meant for exports.7 During these activities it creates a cadre of skilled labors and generates 
employment opportunities for the local people. 
The process of setting up SEZs in China had initially sparked off the debate such westernized 
concepts of building up specific enclaves would lead to further disparity existing in the social 
system. The Local Government along with the Central Government had to convince the 
millions of Chinese that the initiative is only to assist the country in the development of larger 
modernization program that China had thought of working towards. Investments of foreign 
capital would not be administered on a system which would create inequality and hamper 
sovereignty of the state. SEZs would observe the Chinese Government’s laws, rules and 
regulations, pay business and income taxes and abide by Chinese labor laws. Thus overall it 
was accepted that preferential treatment extended to the foreign business men in SEZs is in the 
general good of the economic situation prevailing at home and also in line with the interests of 
China’s socialist economy. Interestingly, unlike India and other developing countries the 
ownership of the land lies with the Chinese Government. 
Within such theoretical framework, SEZs were established to have several specific functions. 
SEZs were to serve as the bridges for introducing foreign capital, advanced technology and 
equipment and to act as a training ground for personnel capable of using that advanced 
technology; to promote competition between regions, between trades and within a certain trade, 
all to the larger end of developing the national economy and expediting Chin’s enterprise 
production and management; to absorb foreign exchange and allow part of technology, capital, 
equipments and management practices to other regions; to perform as an experimental unit in 
the economic structural reform and regulation of production in line with the market demands; 
                                                 
5 The decision was announced at the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress in June 1979. 
6 The decision was taken at the 15th Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress of 
26 August 1980. 
7 Xu Dixin, “China’s Special Economic Zones”, Beijing Review, 24:50, 14 December 1981, p-14. 
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to contribute directly to the export drive of the economy; and finally to give employment to 
many young people.  
The implementation of China’s SEZs began with the State Council’s directive of July 1979 
authorizing Guangdong and Fujian provinces to take extraordinary measures to develop 
manufacturing base, tourism, foreign trade and investment. Special status was thus granted to 
these two coastal provinces to experiment with an alternative form of economic development 
apart from the mainstream policies of socialism on the basis capitalist enterprise and foreign 
capital subject to the approval of municipal planning. 
Four SEZs were thus created in Shenzen, Zuhai, Shantou in the province of Guangdong and 
Xiamen in Fujian province. 
2. POLITICAL PROCESS IN CHINA 
Historically speaking whenever any country or economy has attempted to change from a 
planned economy to a market one, the country has undergone serious transformation. 
Transformation in the course of this change basically referred to fundamental and far-reaching 
restructuring of the system. The political reforms or the process which took place in China 
during this period were centered on the decision making powers for the Government and how 
the Government can facilitate the reform process to achieve its desired goal. 
In China, the Government in the wake of establishing SEZs had faced its share of difficulties. 
New policies became the complicated result of the bargaining processes between the major 
players. These major players were the institutions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
which includes the Politburo, Central Committee and Central Commissions on the one hand 
and the governmental organization like National People’s Congress, State council, Ministries, 
Local governments on the other.  
The party institutions are main political agents, especially the Politburo having the General 
Secretary at the heart of political mobilization. It is always logically proved that in any socialist 
system there always existed a government, but fact is that it is always also controlled by the 
Party. In China the same thing persisted. All the major and specific government policies and 
clarifications concerning the government’s work must first be submitted to the central 
authorities for examination and approval given by the central authorities. Only after relevant 
discussions are taken place and relevant decisions are approved by the central authorities, major 
policies can be implemented.8  
It is further observed that party leaders are also not independent in their decision making. 
Although the party leaders appoint the officials in party, government and military, these are 
again decided by the members of the Central committee of the party which has the authority to 
choose the party leaders.  
                                                 
8 Zhou Yi 1987 cited from Shirk 1993, p-59. 
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It is important to understand that decision making process in China does not follow a pure top-
down approach. Instead it passes through a complicated process finally leading to an agreement 
between different institutions. During the establishment of SEZ in China similar situation was 
faced by the government under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Deng with his political 
astuteness and maneuvering capacity could side the local officials to support the case for 
creation of SEZs in the southern part of China. Setting up SEZs in the coastal region has 
triggered off social discontentment among the locals and local officials in other parts of China 
as they felt their resources were utilized by the Government for export purposes and developing 
the coastal region without really improving the living standards of the entire Chinese society. 
Deng had succeeded in mobilizing more local officials for infusing a sense of decentralization 
into the party structure. He forged a policy change of a stronger decentralization of the 
decision-making power from the party to government institutions and from central to local 
levels. The policy managed to get a nod from the Central Committee, because it supported the 
interest of the majority of the people especially the local representatives. 
Slowly the decentralization process was institutionalized. The decentralization included the 
permission to conduct experiments in any economic field on the local level. In fact sources 
suggest9 that this kind of experimental venture was already in vogue in China. Mao has used 
this instrument to support his ideas. For example, Dazhai was village which started all round 
irrigation project without taking any outside support, at least no government support officially. 
Mao used this as an example to justify and expand his policy and sphere of influence in the 
Chinese society. He had propagated it as a great strength of self reliance. Later on it was found 
that it was not an experiment but a part of the government venture where the Government had 
extended a lot of financial resources to guarantee the success of the scheme10 (Talas, 1991 p-
58). The same kind of mechanism was replicated in later years with SEZs. This scheme 
officially started as an experiment but later on received the local and state governments’ 
patronage to become successful so that the experiment can continue and can be further 
extended to other parts of the country. 
China also witnessed some amount of opposition from the Central Party while laying down the 
plans for establishing SEZs, because smooth functioning of SEZs had also required reforming 
the SOEs. The SOEs were not able to perform or compete with the private companies and were 
unable to maximize the returns. The Government could not directly bring in any change in the 
system that time as more than two third work force of the urban areas were dependent on it. 
Besides, the interests of these enterprises were represented by high officials of certain powerful 
ministries and central bureaucracy. 
So the Central government resorted to the mechanism of decentralizing again the decision 
making powers and slowly passed them on to the local officials. The local governments were 
                                                 
9 Shirk, S (1993) The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China, Berkeley , USA, p-63. 
10 Talas, B (1991)  Economic Reforms and Political Reforms in China 1979-1989, Berlin, p-58. 
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further encouraged to support the development of private and collective enterprises which 
increased competition and put indirect pressure on the SOEs to restructure.11  
3. REFORMS NEEDED TO ESTABLISH SEZS  
The SEZs were initially located in the southern region because some parts of the region were 
already exposed to the outward orientation of foreign trade and strategic advantages. Some of 
the major reforms that were introduced in the SEZs were as under. 
Administrative Reforms 
Less and less involvement of bureaucratic procedures were introduced to the economic 
structure of SEZs. Prices were introduced as the new co-ordination mechanism and taxes and 
interest rates were used by the government to influence the economic behavior. 
Entrepreneurship 
The Government reduced direct interference with the private enterprises. They could 
independently decide about the products, prices, specifications and marketing and were not 
under the direct control of the government. An independent contract system was established to 
coordinate between the government and private enterprises. 
Competition 
Though the Government could not completely reform the SOEs because of strong social 
pressure, yet their access to state resources like access to loans, scarce goods were largely 
curtailed. They were introduced to competition. Many of them suffered from huge losses and 
rest of them found it difficult to compete with foreign funded enterprises in the newly goods 
and factor markets. Markets for labor, land, capital and foreign exchange were created. 
Price Reform 
A distorted price structure persisted till the reforms began. The Government continued with 
such a system to achieve political gains. To benefit from the establishment of SEZ and to 
interact with the world market system, restructuring of the distorted price system was needed. 
A three-price system, namely fixed, free and floating was introduced, keeping in view that it 
will help the consumers, the producers, the world market and the Chinese economy.  
Employment 
The earlier ‘iron rice bowl’ system of guaranteed employment scheme was abolished. In place 
of that a contract labor market scheme was introduced. Foreign invested enterprises were 
allowed to freely employ people and these employments were supported by the labor service 
based company to find the right kind of skilled workers for the employment in SEZs. 
                                                 
11 Knoth, E and Konstanz, Marz (2000) Special Economic Zones and Economic Transformation:The Case of 
People’s Republic of China, Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany, p-58. 
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Companies had the choice of employing the right people with varied wages and lots of benefits 
were given to those workers as incentives to be retained in the companies. 
Banking reforms 
Foreign banks were allowed to open their representative offices in China. Other functions of the 
financial systems like stocks and bonds markets were reformed and floating rate of interest was 
also introduced for various users. Other institutions of financial sector like swap centers were 
first tested in the SEZs only. 
With all these reforms and restructuring, China’s experiment of establishing SEZs became 
successful and the experiments were allowed to be tested at different places in the country. 
Role of FDI 
The year 1978 marked a watershed in the history of Chinese economy. The development 
strategy underwent a new paradigm shift-from import substituting policies to export led growth. 
Though the initial motive was to have an all round development of Chinese society, yet the 
practicality of approach was such that it had to foster an unequal stages of development. To 
begin with, some regions with special and comparative advantages would be developed and 
later on rest of the regions can derive support from those regions. On the sixth National 
people’s Congress meet the Prime Minister Mr. Zhao Ziyang formulated strategy which 
signified that the mid and large sized cities in the coastal and inner regions would be developed 
as growth centers and development of the less developed areas with less favorable conditions 
would be taken up later.12 
Closer proximity to the sea coast and having access to free port system in Hong Kong the 
southern region became the favorite location for Chinese leaders to establish SEZs. These 
locations also had a long tradition of trading since the British days and Opium War in 1840. In 
spite of these advantages the opposition camp in the central party had also objected to the idea 
of creating SEZs there because they had expressed that these regions are also suffering from a 
low growth and implantation of such new policy may further jeopardize their social existence. 
In 1978, Fujian was one of the ten poorest provinces in China and Guangdong was having 
similar level of growth. The Government took this as a good opportunity to try out a new 
experimental policy as the growth level is already low and it won’t bear the brunt of the people 
and affect the country much. 
Irrespective of the arguments against the Government designed the policies which favored the 
growth of international trade and economic development for the southern regions by giving 
special preferential treatment to foreigners and technology providers. 
With the establishment of SEZs, China could invite large amount of FDI for its economic 
development and got an access to international trade to integrate its economy with the world. It 
                                                 
12 Ibid, p-26. 
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happened at a time when major shift in the trade flows especially to developing countries was 
taking place. During the 1980s developing countries received about US$15bn, about one third 
of the total world trade flows. In the 1990s developing countries’ share continued to rise, 
though developed countries were still receiving more.13 
Contribution of Overseas Chinese 
It is a well known factor that culture plays a dynamic role in influencing the business practices 
and economic development of various societies. Cultural affinity and patriotism sometimes 
have remained so strong among the native and overseas of a particular race that the overseas 
has always contributed significantly to the development of that country. Contribution of 
overseas Chinese settled in Asia to China in that context has been exemplary. With their special 
institutions and specific ways of organizing the flow of information and goods between the 
members of the group they are in a position to act successfully in environments which are even 
relatively unstable or difficult to change. The reform process in China is an example of how 
culture especially the common culture can influence the transitional growth of an economy and 
how the development of Chinese SEZs can not be evaluated without taking into account the 
role of the overseas Chinese.  
Overseas Chinese settled in Asian region mainly in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Malaysia and 
Singapore has performed remarkably as an individual community. It is estimated that the 
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia with less than 10 per cent of the population control up to 
two third of the retail trade and their investments are larger than the investments of the 
Japanese. The monetary influence these people enjoyed in this part is phenomenal as it is 
observed that 86 per cent of South East Asian billionaires belonged to this group.14 
Most of the foreign capital which came into China came from the overseas Chinese. In 1987, 
70 per cent of FDI came from Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore. This 
share, however, decreased over the years to 67 per cent in 1996 and 54 per cent in 1997.  By 
1995 it was also found that 96 per cent of Shenzhen’s textile industry and 95 per cent of its 
garments industry were owned by Hong Kong investors (Lau, 2001). This indicates that the 
foreign flow from these countries to china is still controlled and decided by the overseas 
Chinese. 
The relationship between Hong Kong and China even grew stronger during late seventies and 
eighties and even continued further. Most of the companies from Hong Kong had their 
production plants in China, about more than 90 per cent were in Shenzhen and Guangzhou 
area.15 The Chinese Government became fully aware of the importance of such a potent and 
powerful business community as a result formulated policies and strategies that would benefit 
                                                 
13 Li, F and J Li (1999) Foreign Investment in China, Palgrave, Houndmills, UK, p-32. 
14 East Asian analytical unit (1995) Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia, Canberra, p-119. 
15 Knoth, E and Konstanz, Marz (2000) Special Economic Zones and Economic Transformation:The Case of 
People’s Republic of China, Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany,p-70. 
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them. On the other hand, these overseas Chinese business communities were keenly following 
the developments at home and were interested to expand their business plans in China. China 
being a huge country provided them a great opportunity to invest.  
Table- 1: Regional distribution of FDI (million US-$) 
 1984 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Hainan 18  95 101 176 452 734 918 1062 789 706 
Guangdong 644 651 1323 1460 1823 3552 7498 9463 10260 11754 12635 
Fujian 62 119 348 290 403 1416 2867 3713 4044 4085 4197 
Zhejiang 49 27 54 48 92 294 1033 1150 1258 1521 1503 
Jiangsu 139 33 127 141 233 1403 3002 3763 5191 5210 5435 
Shandong 16 36 163 151 180 973 1843 2552 2689 2634 2776 
Shanghai 42 108 422 177 164 790 2318 2473 2893 3941 4225 
Tianjin  56 31 83 94 116 233 1015 1521 2153 2511 
Beijing  89 320 277 245 350 667 1372 1080 1553 1593 
Liaoning 15 25 126 248 314 439 1227 1440 1425 1738 2366 
Jilin 2 5 10 17 18 66 238 242 408 452 402 
Coastal 987 1148 3020 2993 3740 9851 21660 28102 31830 35829 38349 
Heilongjiang 24 4 57 25 19 103 226 348 517 567 735 
Neimenggu  3 4 11 1 6 0 40 58 72 73 
Hebei 5 8 44 39 44 174 357 523 547 830 1103 
Shaanxi  16 97 42 32 46 234 239 324 326 628 
Shanxi  1 10 3 4 54 70 32 64 138 269 
Anhui  3 9 10 10 50 258 370 483 507 434 
Hubei  8 29 29 46 203 534 602 625 681 849 
Henan 7 8 46 10 38 52 435 387 479 524 692 
Hunan 11 27 23 11 23 129 433 331 508 745 917 
Jiangxi 2 10 9 6 19 97 208 262 289 301 481 
Central 50 88 328 187 236 912 2756 3133 3892 4691 6181 
Gansu  1 1 1 1 47 56 88 64 90 41 
Guangxi  31 53 30 39 180 872 836 673 663 886 
Guizhou 1 10 13 5 7 20 43 64 57 31 50 
Ningxia  0 0 1 1 3 12 7 4 5 7 
Qinghai  0 0 0 0  4 2 2 1 2 
Sichuan  29 13 16 24 184 578 922 542 441 248 
Xinjiang 7 11 1 7 4 10 53 48 55 64 25 
Yunnan 0 2 8 3 3 23 97 65 98 65 166 
Western 7 83 89 62 79 468 1715 2032 1493 1360 1425 
Source: China State Statistical Yearbook, various issues 
Table-1 provides, around mid-1980s coastal region received US$1 billion of foreign capital 
while the central and western regions to the tune of 50 and 7 million. Although in the next 13 
years the FDI to central region increased to over 6biilion and to the western to almost 1.5 
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billion, this was still not enough compared to the absolute inflow of over 38 billion into the 
coastal region. A look at the Table-2 suggests, the coastal provinces were losing some of their 
of over 90 per cent which they got in mid 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s in the total 
FDI inflow, which then decreased to 83 per cent in 1997. 
Table-1 suggests another interesting aspect of the regional distribution where it says the areas 
like Guangdong and Fujian garnered more than 70 per cent of the foreign capital. This over 
concentration of capital came down substantially over the years, yet both secured a combined 
share of almost 44 per cent. As can be seen from Table-1, Hainan the fifth SEZ, was with less 
than 2 per cent of the overall investment in the coastal provinces, not a major destination for 
attracting FDI. 
Table-2: Shares in FDI inflow by regions 
 
 1984 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Coastal 95% 87% 88% 92% 92% 88% 83% 84% 86% 86% 83% 
Central 5% 7% 10% 6% 6% 8% 11% 9% 10% 11% 13% 
Western 1% 6% 3% 2% 2% 4% 7% 6% 4% 3% 3% 
Source: China State Statistical Yearbook, various issues 
When China initiated its process of attracting foreign investment, it never meant it for SEZs 
only. Investments for the rest of the country were possible. That is why only part of the 
investments came to SEZs. Until mid 1980s the share of FDI in SEZs was 30 per cent of the 
total foreign investments. And about 80 per cent of the FDI in SEZs only came from Hong 
Kong and Macao. 
Inflows of FDI also showed pattern of destinations. Some investors were attracted towards 
SEZs because of the preferential condition s while other located themselves in the major cities 
such as Beijing, shanghai, Guangzhou, Dalian, etc. These investors were mostly interested in 
the manufacture of high-tech products as a result they were to keen have the skilled workers 
who can adapt and able to handle the technology application, plus demanded good 
infrastructure, wanted to remain closer to the political decision makers and invested larger 
volumes of capital in the individual projects. 16  These investments came from developed 
countries like US and Japan who were interested in high tech products and wanted to have 
strong foothold in the Chinese market. Examples are Volkswagen and Schindler in Shanghai 
and Beijing.17 
Asian investors other than Japan invested in SEZs because they were comfortable with labor 
intensive products, low end technology and low cost labor, and had smaller amount of capital to 
invest in individual projects.  
An important aspect from the analysis was observed that the foreign investors who invested in 
SEZs lured by the preferential incentives were those who were not in a position to fulfil various 
                                                 
16 Li, F and J Li (1999) Foreign Investment in China, Palgrave, Houndmills, UK, p-40. 
17 Pearson, M. (1991) Joint Ventures in the PR China, Princeton, p-32. 
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obligations of the central government like technology transfer, building up of country wide 
infrastructure and upgrading of high skilled workers. Others were interested because of the 
large size of the domestic market. 
Table-3: Import and Exports of Foreign-Funded Enterprises (billion US-$) 
 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Import 0 2.1 12 17 26 42 53 63 76 78 
Export 0 3.0 12 25 17 25 35 47 62 75 
Import 
GD* 
     19 25 27 30 33 
Export 
GD* 
     14 20 26 31 37 
Import 
China 
20 42 53 64 81 104 116 132 139 142 
Export 
China 
18 27 62 72 85 92 121 149 151 183 
Source: CFESY(China Foreign Economic Statistical Year Book)(1995:164), CSY (1996: 596), 
CSY (1998: 636) 
 GD = Guangdong province 
The Table-3 demonstrates the rapid movement of volumes of imports and exports of foreign 
funded enterprise in entire China and Guangdong province. Both imports and exports of 
enterprises with foreign capital had an annual growth rate between 1990 and 1997 of about 30 
per cent. In the earlier years of reform in China until 1991 the trade balance of the foreign 
enterprises was positive, became negative soon after 1991. For the entire country the trade 
balance of all the enterprises was negative in the 1980s, but became positive in the 1990s.  
4. SHENZHEN- A SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLE 
Shenzhen was the largest of all the four SEZs that initially started in 1978. With 316 sq km it 
covers an area of 2020 sq km.18 It was a small town having common border with Hong Kong 
and was also very close to the main business activity centre of Hong Kong. Compared to other 
places like Xiamen and Shantou, Shenzhen had no industrial base. Only advantage was that it 
was close to Hong Kong.  
In the late seventies when the talk has already begun in terms of Hong Kong getting handed 
over to China and China is interested to spread its expansionist role in South East Asia as far as 
Taiwan is concerned, the establishment of SEZ in Shenzhen came quite handy for the Chinese 
Government. By late nineties almost around 1997 it had developed into modern city with 
advanced infrastructural facility and trying to be the real commercial hub for Chinese economy 
and becoming the international linkage point between China, Hong Kong and world market. It 
became one of the most important locations in China for foreign investment. 
After the establishment of SEZ in Shenzhen, the small sleepy town developed rapidly with 
improved social and basic amenities infrastructural facilities. In less than twenty years the 
population rose to 4 million, of which 2.8 million had only temporary resident cards. In China 
                                                 
18 Shenzhen Statistical Year Book (1998), Peking, p-95. 
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the hukou or the household registration system was followed which controlled the migration of 
population moving from one city to another. With the reforms, the hukou was relaxed. As a 
result, developed region like Shenzhen experienced in 1980s and 1990s good number of 
migrant workers. Higher wages, access to modern social and educational facilities, better 
opportunities for employment, availability of quality goods and cleaner environment attracted 
and continued to lure a large population of Chinese to come to Shenzhen. Table 4 shows 
increase in population, temporary workers and employment scenario.  
A minute observation at Table 4 suggests that in the first year of development only 45 per cent 
of the population was employed and in the mid 19980s the share of employment decreased. But 
in the 1990s the trend was reversed, an increase share of population was employed. This shows 
that a new trend has occurred in the employment structure which symbolizes that migrant 
workers from inner areas have come to Shenzhen for a limited period of time on a temporary 
residence card and never brought there families. This development demonstrates that 
employment share in Shenzhen was much higher than other parts of China. 
In relation to investment at Shenzhen, it shows an interesting trend. In the initial years (1979-80) 
the major investors were the Central Government and the Provincial government, contributing 
to 66 per cent of infrastructural investment. The foreign capital during this period was to the 
tune of 13 per cent. Table 8 provides the investment pattern of various stakeholders in 
Shenzhen SEZ. 
Foreign investment rose significantly in the year 1982, making it 50 per cent from 13 per cent 
in 1980. During early 1980s, share of the Governments started decreasing. During the same 
time the contribution of private companies increased to one-third in 1990, while the 
contribution of the government fell below five percent in 1985. 
The contribution of Chinese SEZs to its GDP is well recognized. As China continued in the 
1980 and 1990 to register a growth rate of 8 to 8.5, the real GDP of Shenzhen SEZ grew with 
an annual average of robust 28.5 per cent over these years. Until 1998, the absolute level of the 
real GDP was not very high and did not reach 4 billion Yuan. But in the next eight years 
massive growth was noticed taking the amount to 17 billion Yuan.19 
Looking at the three major sectors how they have performed in Shenzhen SEZ, the analysis 
suggests that the agricultural sector’s contribution to GDP was 70 million Yuan. Interestingly, 
the tertiary industry contributed more than agriculture around 80 million Yuan and the 
secondary sector contributed with 40 million Yuan having the least contribution among the 
three sectors in the GDP. During the reform process this has changed fundamentally. Until the 
early 1990s, agriculture’s GDP grew to 240-290 million Yuan and stayed in the range 
between1979-1997.20  
                                                 
19 Knoth, E and Konstanz, Marz (2000) Special Economic Zones and Economic Transformation:The Case of 
People’s Republic of China, Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany, p-99. 
20 Ibid, p-100. 
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The share of agriculture in the total GDP has decreased from 37 per cent in 1979 to just 1 per 
cent in 1997. While the share of tertiary industry remained between 42 per cent and 52 per cent, 
the share of the secondary industry increased from 21 per cent in 1979 to 49 per cent in 1997, 
with a maximum of 55 per cent in 1993 and 1994. 
Employment 
The employment scenario had undergone changes with the change in the economic structure of 
Shenzhen SEZ. Compared to earlier years the rate of employment increased very fast between 
1979 and 1997. Establishment of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) had given a boost 
to the employment generation in China even at rural areas. The TVEs had dominated the labor 
markets in Shenzhen. In the initial stage of reforms and in the 1990s, TVEs were the largest 
employer in Shenzhen. Their labor force had increased from 90,000 in 1979 to 1.2 million 
employees in 1997. In the early 1980s the SOEs had increased its share of total employment as 
a result by mid 1980s it had acquired the largest share in the total employment with 52 per cent. 
By mid 1990s the trend had become reverse and TVEs had occupied the largest share again. In 
the 1990s the employment scenario remained almost the same. On the other hand, the collective 
enterprises had expanded its labor force from 7000 in 1979 to 87000 in 1997.21 Tables 5 and 6 
give the detailed picture about the above analysis. Other significant developments are the 
emergence of self employed groups and employees in other enterprises. 
The self employment was a new concept which gathered momentum during the reforms era. 
Before the reforms it was the work unit or the danwei was the employer which provided all the 
social benefits like health care, pensions, kindergarten education and accommodation. Not 
belonging to any employer was basically left to yourselves where individuals themselves were 
responsible for all the social benefits. This group of self employment became much stronger 
during the mid 1990s when more and more individuals wanted to take more risk.  
 
Table-5: Employment [‘000] 
 




34 40 170 340 390 390 410 390 400 410 410 
Township 
enterprises 
95 97 84 430 500 590 690 1,000 1,100 1,100 1,200 
Collective 
enterprises 
7 8 30 50 70 80 50 80 110 95 87 
Self-
employment 
4 4 6 30 40 90 290 320 460 490 610 
Others - - 30 160 190 240 310 350 380 390 420 
Source: SZSYB(Shenzhen Statistical Year Book) (1998: 124) 
 
                                                 
21 Ibid, p-103. 
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Table-6: Shares in Total employment22 
 
 1979 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
State-owned 
enterprises 
24% 27% 52% 31% 31% 26% 20% 17% 17% 16% 15% 
Township 
enterprises 
68% 65% 25% 39% 39% 40% 33% 45% 45% 43% 44% 
Collective 
enterprises 
5% 5% 9% 5% 6% 5% 2% 4% 4% 4% 3% 
Self-
employment 
3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 6% 14% 14% 19% 19% 22% 
Others 0% 0% 9% 15% 15% 16% 15% 16% 16% 15% 15% 
Source: SZSYB (1998: 124) 
On the whole the employment generation in Shenzhen SEZ has been impressive. Almost major 
sectors like agriculture, industry, construction, communications, banking and insurance 
experienced prospective employment opportunities and secured a significant rise in 
employment. The main loser in the 1990s has been hotel and real estate sector. Despite certain 
present and potential difficulties, the process of modem economic reform in China has been 
proceeding very well and the commitment to give a boost to the initiative of SEZ23 as a major 
drive of societal inclusion is very much on the card. 
Contributions of SEZs to China’s Development 
The SEZs have made crucial contributions to China’s success. Some especially the first ones—
successfully tested the market economy and new institutions and established role models for the 
rest of the country to follow. By 1992, the concept of openness had been extended to the entire 
coastal region and to all capital cities of provinces and autonomous regions in the interior, and 
various types of SEZs had begun to spring up throughout the country. When Deng Xiaoping 
made his famous southern tour in 1992, the mission that had started with the creation of the 
first five SEZs had in many respects been accomplished: the “special” economic zones. 
Economically, SEZs have contributed significantly to national 13 GDP, employment, exports, 
and attraction of foreign investment and new technologies, as well as adoption of modern 
management practices, among others. In 2006, the five initial SEZs accounted for 5 percent of 
China’s total real GDP, 22 percent of total merchandise exports, and 9 percent of total FDI 
inflows. At the same time, the 54 national ETDZs accounted for 5 percent of total GDP, 15 
percent of exports, and 22 percent of total FDI inflows (national statistical yearbook of China 
2007). 
                                                 
22 Ibid, p-103. 
23 China has engaged in opening in all directions. China Is Open In All Directions, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Oct. 8, 
1992, at I (overseas Chinese language ed.). Many formerly restricted areas are now also open. See James 
McGregor, China to Open Oil Frontier to Foreigners, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1993, at A13; James McGregor & 
John J. Keller, AT&T, China Set Broad Pact On Phones, Gear, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1993, at A3; China Widens 
Door to Retailers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1993, at A10; Xu Ke Hong & Wang Yan Rong, China Will Permit Use 
Of Foreign Capital To Build Railroad, PEOPLE'S DAILY, July 16, 1992, at 1 (overseas Chinese language ed.) 
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The SEZs are also a major platform for attracting foreign investment. In 2007, the actual 
utilized FDI of the five initial SEZs was about US$7.3 billion. The number for Shanghai 
Pudong and Tianjin Binhai was about US$7.2 billion (Zhong et al. 2009), for the ETDZs about 
US$17.3 billion (MOFCOM 2008b), and for the FTZs about US$2.6 billion (Zhong et al. 2009). 
The contribution of SEZs to national employment is also very significant. In 2006, the total 
employment of the initial five SEZs was about 15 million, accounting for 2 percent of national 
employment In 2007– 08, total employment was about 1.47 million in the Shanghai PudongS 
area (Shanghai Pudong Government 2008), accounting for about 17 percent of the total 
employment of the municipality of Shanghai.  
The SEZs are also the hotbed of China’s new and high-technology firms. In 2007, the 54 
HIDZs hosted about half the national high-tech firms and science and technology incubators. 
They registered some 50,000 invention patents in total, more than 70 percent of which were 
registered by domestic firms (Zhong et al. 2009). They also hosted 1.2 million R&D personnel 
(18.5 15 percent of HIDZ employees) and accounted for 33 percent of the national high-tech 
output (Qian 2008). Over the 15 years since the formation of HIDZs, they have accounted for 
half of China’s high-tech gross industrial output and one-third of China’s high-tech exports. In 
addition, the ETDZs are also responsible for another one-third of China’s high-tech industrial 
output and exports (rising from 31.3 percent in 2004 to 35.5 percent in 2005). HIDZs are also 
quite R&D intensive: their expenditure on R&D in 2002 was RMB 31.4 billion and accounted 
for 24.4 percent of China’s total R&D expenditure. Within the following four years, their R&D 
expenditure tripled to RMB 105.4 billion, and the share rose to 35.1 in 2006 (Fu and Gao 2007). 
In spite of the success that emanated out of SEZ initiative, certain challenges remain for China 
to tackle. These challenges are mostly in the realm of environmental and resource constraints.  
Environmental and Resource Constraints 
Related to China’s growth model based on low technology and labor- and resource intensive 
manufacturing, many SEZs and clusters face serious environmental and resource challenges. 
With the increasing emphasis on climate change problems, two aspects related to 
environmental challenges call for particular attention: one is the serious water, air, and land 
pollution and the huge amount of industrial waste; the other is the increasingly tough eco-
standards set by industrial countries for products exported from developing countries. These 
include RoHS (Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances), WEEE (Waste 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment), and EuP (energy-using products). These challenges are 
even more severe for clusters, where the technology capacity is much weaker, than for most 
SEZs. In addition, with the rapid industrial expansion, land, skilled labor, and energy resources 
such as oil, water, and electricity have all become more expensive and limited. In some cities, 
virtually no more land is available for heavily resource-based manufacturing activities, which 
require a lot of physical space. In many SEZs, the land cost now is several times higher than it 
was when they were established. These problems have forced some firms to move inland or 
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abroad; however, that is only a short-term solution. In the long run, the SEZs and clusters will 
need to focus more on growth quality than on quantity. 
No doubt, China’s success with SEZs is an example for many countries to emulate, but the 
institutional challenges that play a role in its success is still an exercise that even continues now 
and is a necessary condition. With the evolution and adoption of market economy, efficient and 
transparent institutions such as sound regulatory and legal system, including a well-functioning 
IPR regime; a participatory monitoring and supervisory system; a good evaluation mechanism, 
especially for public spending; and a sound social safety net need to be created and developed 
to sustain the long term growth in SEZ as well as integrating coastal region with the mainland 
China. The resources in the western part of China are immense; there is a need to create SEZs 
and clusters in those regions so that the country could develop horizontally and economic 
growth could touch the nook and corners of the country. As Bhagwati (2004) put it in 
discussing growth, “Growth was not a passive, trickle-down strategy for helping the poor. It 
was an active, pull-up strategy instead. It required a government that would energetically take 
steps to accelerate growth through a variety of policies including building infrastructure such as 
roads and ports and attracting foreign funds.” In the success of the Chinese SEZs and clusters, 
government at various levels has played a very important role but one limited mostly to 
addressing market failures and externalities, that is, the public goods and quasi-public goods 
areas. These range from building better infrastructure—roads, water, electricity, gas, telephone, 
and so forth—to establishing special marketplaces, technology innovation platforms, R&D 
centers, and the like. In addition, the government has tried to use the special powers given to 
the SEZs to create an efficient regulatory system and a conducive business environment, which 
make SEZs more attractive for investors. As Chief Economist of World Bank, Justin Lin 
observes “In addition to an effective market mechanism, the government should play an active, 
facilitating role in the industrial diversification and upgrading process and in the improvement 
of infrastructure” (2010). These SEZs still have more to do in improving the business 
environment to maintain their competitive edge.  
Lagging in social development will also put up a huge challenge for China’s SEZ model of 
success. Though they have witnessed economic success yet they are away from social 
integration. They are not commensurate with desirable social status and services. Although 
some SEZs and clusters enjoy a good living environment, many of them do not have sufficient 
health and education services or public transportation to accommodate their increasing 
population. Some SEZs are at a distance from their host cities, like an “isolated island” with 
few cultural and leisure activities (Li, Xiaoxi, R. Duan, and H. Zhang, 2009), and they worry 
that once they lose more of their “special” status and preferential treatment, they might not be 
able to attract more talent and investment. So the government needs to make more public 
investment in health and education and try to link these SEZs with large parts of economic 
activity and mainstream. The words of Amartya Sen finds quintessential meaning that human 
capital is essential for a country’s progress and this can be achieved only when the government 
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invests in social sector and redistribution of income is extremely important for the country to 
make a progress. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
SEZs played an important role in China’s initial economic growth. Its contribution in regional 
and national economic development has been significant despite all the fundamental and 
inherent problems surrounding the system. The success of SEZ was seen as an unprecedented 
experiment to improve its economy which remained almost stagnant in a self contained 
protective industrialized regime. It was virtually the most important instrument in propelling its 
growth, though its relative significance gradually declined as the economy entered into 
advanced stage of development. 
The initial years of experimenting with SEZs have been quite problematic as the country was 
passing through significant political, economic and legal changes. Many of these policies came 
under severe criticism and scrutiny as they involved some amount of social cost. All these 
problems were attributable to the fact that China was then at the point of transition- from low 
income to middle income developing country and transition from planned economy to a market 
one. 
It won’t be an exaggeration to say that establishment and success of SEZs have been a great 
learning experience for China. To think of SEZ as a policy instrument of economic growth, an 
important measure for attracting foreign direct investment and a viable alternative of 
employment generation especially at a time when the economy was virtually in shambles with 
the death of Mao and long drawn Cultural Revolution requires huge amount of risk that a 
society can really take. From a self reliant, insulated planned economy to creating a market 
based economy, China has faced enormous challenges and during this time it had tried to 
establish the SEZs as a growth model for the country. It had confronted with many political 
battles and finally managed to hold its decision of creating SEZs. Opposition to creation of 
SEZs was very strong in China because by definition SEZs were promoting regional 
development and the some political establishment was convinced that such a policy would 
create strong regional inequality.  
Having this fear in mind China from the very beginning was gradually and tentatively moving 
towards establishing SEZs. Therefore, it took it basically as an experimental exercise. 
As more and more studies established the pros and cons of SEZs, it came to the light that SEZs 
have seriously contributed to the growing regional inequality in China. Because, not all SEZs in 
China was smooth and successful especially in Hainan. Any case to deal with the regional 
inequality was beyond the scope of this paper, hence, it would not focus on this issue. It would 
rather try to look at certain policy recommendations if possible to provide. 
Policy Recommendations 
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In the gamut of international trade, the model ‘one size fits all’ does not hold true. All these 
countries wanting to benefit from the process of globalization and multilateral trading system 
are unable to do so because these countries are in different stages of development and seriously 
suffer from various constraints which one size fits all is unable to address or overlooks them. In 
that context, China’s SEZ experience can not be replicated in the case of other countries even if 
it is a phenomenal success. Establishment of SEZs in any country needs to be very carefully 
designed as it depends on a number of sensitive factors. Prominent among them is definitely a 
political decision making power which varies from country to country and can create a 
significantly high volatile situation. Besides, it also critically rests on a number of economic 
and institutional factors. Policy recommendation mentioned here are equally important for 
China as well as other developing countries. 
First, the aim of the zone development should be clearly defined. Then only, it can be 
visualized whether SEZ can act as a best policy instrument to achieve those desired results. It is 
crucial to know whether the aim is short term or long term, because the main effects of SEZs 
are long term in nature. It involves planning, infrastructure development, huge investment, 
factor endowments and prospects of employment generation-all these are long term driven and 
require consensual political decision, which is hard to come by. 
Secondly, the decision of a location is very important for which the political decision makers 
need to be convinced. In some countries SEZs were established in remote places in anticipation 
that FDI and an export sector would help prosper a particular region and create jobs. But such 
attempts have ended in failure, because foreign investors were never interested to invest in a 
region which was underdeveloped and lacked serious infrastructural facilities, devoid of 
qualified personnel and any other valuable inputs. Further, it is important to consider that SEZs 
should have an easy and direct access to international trading as the place would largely be 
developing export products for the third country. Hence, a port or an international airport 
becomes a necessary condition for success of an SEZ or at least development of such 
infrastructure should be in the immediate sight. 
It will be constructive to think of a bigger area for an SEZ, not smaller enclaves like EPZ. 
Initial constraint of funding might be a cause for worry but a larger area can put in place a 
comprehensive development concept which can contribute more effectively to the growth of 
the country.  
Thirdly, nature and control of investment needs to be monitored and utilized in the right 
perspective. FDI should be carefully chosen to have a strong backward linkage as a result the 
domestic industry will get a boost and the country on the whole can be on a development path. 
Domestic enterprises having the necessary wherewithal should be given a chance in the SEZ to 
have the preferential treatment to do better. The investment on domestic enterprise needs to be 
effectively managed so that SEZs do not create disproportional regional development. 
Domestic enterprises may try to relocate themselves in SEZ to earn preferential treatments. 
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Fourthly, the timing is very important. For the SEZ to be successful, a well planned early stage 
is essential. All the major development steps should be completed in a short time frame 
otherwise the investors will lose interest and the people will develop distrust in a system that 
promises to do a lot. The aims of the development should be clearly defined made public just to 
avoid any other major calamity like Nandigram in West Bengal. 
Fifthly, development of state of the art infrastructure will hold the key to success of SEZs in 
any country. As one of the primary aims of the SEZs being to attract FDI and utilize it 
optimally to promote exports, it is therefore not only important that the produced goods, 
resources and intermediate inputs reach the production site at low cost, the foreign investors 
find the necessary infrastructure in place, including transportation, water and electricity, 
effective telecommunications systems, etc. 
Sixthly, the labor market plays a crucial role in the success of SEZs. As SEZs are constantly 
attracting the foreign capital and desire to have the advanced technology for production of 
goods and services, the country therefore needs to have sophisticated skilled manpower base to 
handle and adapt such technologies in the production process. This may become a decisive 
investment decision for the investors. The country needs to give adequate attention to this 
segment of investment requirement. Even SEZs in China had also faced similar problem of 
skilled labor scarcity. 
Seventhly, an effective transparent legal system is essential to secure foreign investment as 
foreign investors would be clear in their mind as to how their investment and technical know-
how will be protected. Protection of foreign investors’ interests and their property rights has 
forced China to reformulate legal laws to attract FDI. Besides, the role of legal system should 
not be confined to the SEZS only it should be rather applicable to the entire country as the 
whole country needs to be developed. So the country to have distribution of FDI, a secured 
legal system will remain a pre condition. China has used its SEZs to design new laws and to 
have new legal experience which are incorporated during the years of its WTO negotiations. 
Eighthly, a simplified bureaucratic and legal framework is vital for smooth setting up of SEZs 
and foreign enterprises. Foreign investors mostly confront with many bureaucratic hassles 
before they set up their enterprises whether for export or import purposes. A single window 
clearance must be established by a single agency who will function more like a company that a 
government agency. Clear cut aims and objectives of SEZs must be spelt out to this agency 
beforehand. This will also reduce the transaction cost immensely. 
Ninthly, SEZs should have the basic objective and aim in mind to support the development of 
national unified market. Regional development in the initial phase is welcome, but the lateral 
perspective should be to link the prosperous enterprises in the developed region to other 
enterprises in different regions of the country. 
One of the important functions of the SEZs would be to establish the backward and forward 
linkages with the economy. To achieve this, SEZs should help in transferring the information to 
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other parts of the country. This hasn’t happened in China. In a size of economy like China, 
SEZs are not able to foster such linkage as a result segmentation of markets also exists. It has 
rather created certain growth poles. It is important that countries with large domestic market 
should use the market access to foreigners as a source of bargain for development of a unified 
domestic market. 
Lastly, zone development must be initiated according to the capacity of the Government to 
handle. Sometimes establishing too many SEZs in a country can jeopardize the prospect of the 
overall economy. Because regions would be in competition with each other to attract FDI by 
giving more tax benefits, extending tax holidays, lowering the land and utility costs and giving 
more subsidized inputs. Important gainer of this exercise would be the foreign investors. 
Therefore, a comprehensive zonal development plan is vital. 
How to Make China’s Growth Inclusive and Sustainable 
Given so much complexity and challenges, China needs to develop an appropriate strategy by 
focusing on a more competitive and sustainable development paradigm. As world economy is 
moving towards an increased transactions of intensely technology  driven and value added 
services, China has to carve out a comprehensive strategy to make it economy commensurate 
with such demands. With the resources and labor rising and emphasis of trade protectionism in 
place, China low-cost labor advantage and particularly its factor growth model may not prove 
useful in the long run. China needs to make its human and resources more innovation and 
technology driven. After all in a world economy which is significantly dominated by high end 
knowledge and services sector, developing competency in these areas becomes critical. China 
has to make public spending enormously in its technical education, English speaking initiative, 
adhering to western educated system, developing software skills, etc so that human resources 
become productive and economy is able to participate effectively in world economy. In some of 
the SEZs, the level of higher education of the employee or college educated is very low; hence 
productivity sometimes is below the level of expectation. They are unable to attract skilled 
talent. 
To make growth more inclusive, the Government also has a huge responsibility towards 
protection of environment and ecofriendly activities. In adoption of market economy, many of 
the SEZs face environmental and resource challenges. The growing emphasis on climate 
change has given rise to two related environmental challenges which merit particular attention. 
First is the serious water, air, and land pollution and the huge amount of industrial waste; the 
second is the increasingly tough eco-standards set by industrial countries for products exported 
from developing countries. These include RoHS (Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous 
Substances), WEEE (Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment), and EuP (energy-using 
products). These challenges are even more severe for clusters, where the technology capacity is 
much weaker, than for most SEZs. With the rapid industrial expansion, land, labor and 
resources such as oil, water and electricity have become more expensive and limited. To 
continue with this manufacturing drive, certain cities have no land and in some places land has 
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become extraordinarily expensive for the firms to look for foreign destination, however this is a 
short term strategy. In the long run SEZs have to focus on growth quality and not just on 
quantity. The Government has a huge challenge ahead. 
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